Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
Volume 7 (2002), Issue 2, Pages 101-109
doi:10.1080/1026022021000000266
Growth versus environment in dynamic models of capital accumulation
1Faculty of Economics, Chuo University, 742-1 Higashinakano, Hachioji, Tokyo 192-0393, Japan
2Department of Economics, University of Bielefeld, Germany
Received 14 April 2001
Copyright © 2002 Toichiro Asada. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Abstract
In this paper, we study the economic implications of the trade off between growth and environment in the context of dynamic models of capital accumulation. The collective solution is formulated in terms of dynamic optimization of the central planner, and the decentralized solution is formulated in terms of differential game between workers and capitalists. We compare the economic properties of two solutions.